Moral Cost, Commitment, and Committee Size

Steffen Huck and Kai Konrad

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2005, vol. 161, issue 4, 575-588

Abstract: Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not to confiscate the profits from an investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But in some situations there are also some small moral costs for those who vote in favor of default. For the symmetric equilibrium, for given benefits of default, time-consistent default can be ruled out for sufficiently large committees.

JEL-codes: D71 D72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/moral-cost- ... 28093245605775075924 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
Working Paper: Moral cost, commitment, and committee size (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200512)161:4_575:mccacs_2.0.tx_2-2

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().