Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation

Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher

No 55, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: In this paper we show that a simple model of reciprocal preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. However, when communication or informal sanctions are available appropriation behavior is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.

Keywords: common pool resources; experiments; fairness; reciprocity; game theory; fairness models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C91 C92 D00 D63 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Appropriating the Commons A Theoretical Explanation (2001)
Working Paper: Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation (2001)
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