Measuring Social Norms and Preferences using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists

Colin Camerer () and Ernst Fehr

No 97, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: Experimental games turned out to be remarkably productive tools for examining the nature of social preferences and social norms. This paper describes the methods and tools of experimental game theory and provides a selection of games that have been useful. We also discuss the role of evolutionary explanations of and social preference theory in organizing the data in a coherent way.

Keywords: Experiment; Game Theory; Social Norms; Social Preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (218)

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Working Paper: Measuring social norms and preferences using experimental games: A guide for social scientists (2003)
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