Signaling Cooperation

Heiner Schumacher and Matthias Heinz

No 10942, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We examine what an applicant?s vita signals to potential employers about her willingness to cooperate in teams. Intensive social engagement may credibly reveal that an applicant cares about the well-being of others and therefore is less likely to free-ride in teamwork situations. We find that contributions in a public goods game strongly increase in a subject?s degree of social engagement as indicated on her résumé (and rated by an independent third party). Engagement in other domains, such as student or sports associations, is not positively correlated with contributions. In a prediction experiment with human resource managers from various industries, we find that managers use résumé content effectively to predict relative differences in subjects? willingness to cooperate. Thus, young professionals signal important behavioral characteristics to potential employers through the choice of their extracurricular activities.

Keywords: Extracurricular activities; Labor market; Public good; Signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hrm and nep-soc
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Related works:
Journal Article: Signaling cooperation (2017)
Working Paper: Signaling Cooperation (2016)
Working Paper: Signaling cooperation (2015)
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