Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning

Bénabou, Roland, Armin Falk and Jean Tirole
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Roland Benabou

No 13056, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: By downplaying externalities, magnifying the cost of moral behavior, or suggesting not being pivotal, exculpatory narratives can allow individuals to maintain a positive image when in fact acting in a morally questionable way. Conversely, responsibilizing narratives can help sustain better social norms. We investigate when narratives emerge from a principal or the actor himself, how they are interpreted and transmitted by others, and when they spread virally. We then turn to how narratives compete with imperatives (general moral rules or precepts) as alternative modes of communication to persuade agents to behave in desirable ways.

Keywords: Moral behavior; Prosocial behavior; Narratives; Imperatives; Rules; Deontology; Consequentialism; Norms; Organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D64 D78 D83 D85 D9 H4 K42 L14 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-law, nep-mic and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (91)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning (2019)
Working Paper: Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning (2018)
Working Paper: Narratives, Imperatives and Moral Reasoning (2018)
Working Paper: Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning (2018)
Working Paper: Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning (2018)
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