(In)Transparency of Information Acquisition: A Bargaining Experiment

Thomas Gehrig, Güth, Werner and Levínsky, René
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: René Levínský () and Werner Güth ()

No 5817, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We analyze how transparency affects information acquisition in a bargaining context, where proposers may chose to purchase information about the unknown outside option of their bargaining partner. Although information acquisition is excessive in all our scenarios we find that the bargaining outcome depends crucially on the transparency of the bargaining environment. In transparent games, when responders can observe whether proposers have acquired information, acceptance rates are higher. Accordingly, in transparent bargaining environments information is more valuable, both individually and socially.

Keywords: Information acquisition; Ultimatum experiment; transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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