The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis

Jean Tirole, Josh Lerner and Benjamin Chiao

No 6141, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper empirically explores standard-setting organizations? policy choices. Consistent with Lerner-Tirole (2006), we find (a) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (b) a positive correlation between the sponsor-friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker when there is only a limited number of SSOs.

Keywords: Forum shopping; Innovation; Licensing; Standardization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L2 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-net and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (90)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The rules of standard-setting organizations: an empirical analysis (2007)
Working Paper: The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: an Empirical Analysis (2006)
Working Paper: The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis (2005)
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