Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard

Patrick Schmitz

No 6207, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: An upstream firm can license its innovation to downstream firms that have to exert further development effort. There are situations in which more licenses are sold if effort is a hidden action. Moral hazard may thus increase the probability that the product will be developed.

Keywords: Innovation; Licences; Monopoly; Private information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D45 D82 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard (2007)
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