Intellectual Property Provisions in North-South Trade Agreements

Kamal Saggi ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Bernard Hoekman

No 6460, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Using a repeated game approach, this paper models a North-South trade agreement under which North offers South improved market access (via a tariff reduction) if South agrees to prevent local imitation by strengthening its protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). We show that such an agreement arises in equilibrium if South's imitative capacity is neither too high nor too low. The paper also considers a scenario where Southern protection of IPRs is induced via a North-South transfer. A comparison of the two instruments shows that one instrument does not unambiguously dominate the other in terms of sustaining cooperation. We also analyze whether and how the availability of the second instrument affects cooperation given that one instrument is already available.

Keywords: Intellectual property rights; International cooperation; Market access; Tariffs; Trade agreements; Transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 L41 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP6460 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6460

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP6460

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().