Disclosure by Politicians

Andrei Shleifer, Simeon Djankov, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes () and Rafael La Porta

No 7168, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.

Keywords: Business interests; Conflict of interest; Disclosure; Politicians (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Disclosure by Politicians (2010)
Working Paper: Disclosure by Politicians (2010)
Working Paper: Disclosure by Politicians (2009)
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