Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments

Erik Snowberg, Padró i Miquel, Gerard and Sylvain Chassang

No 8003, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study the design of randomized controlled experiments in environments where outcomes are significantly affected by unobserved effort decisions taken by the subjects (agents). While standard randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are internally consistent, the unobservability of effort provision compromises external validity. We approach trial design as a principal-agent problem and show that natural extensions of RCTs--which we call selective trials--can help improve the external validity of experiments. In particular, selective trials can disentangle the effects of treatment, effort, and the interaction of treatment and effort. Moreover, they can help experimenters identify when measured treatment effects are affected by erroneous beliefs and inappropriate effort provision.

Keywords: Blind trials; Compliance; Heterogeneous beliefs; Incentivized trials; Marginal treatment e ects; Mechanism design; Randomized controlled trials; Selection; Selective trials (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C81 C93 D82 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments (2012)
Working Paper: Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments (2010)
Working Paper: Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments (2010)
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