X-Games

Ran Spiegler () and Kfir Eliaz

No 9814, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: What is common to the following situations: incentivizing collective action in the presence of social preferences, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which unifies these situations as well as others, and use it to unify and extend the separate analyses that they received in the literature.

Keywords: Contagion; Coordination; Externalities; Strategic complementarities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mkt
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Related works:
Journal Article: X-games (2015)
Working Paper: X-Games (2013)
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