On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness

Agustín Bonifacio and Jordi Masso

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 124, issue C, 219-238

Abstract: We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Unanimity; Anonymity; Tops-onlyness; Single-peakedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness (2019)
Working Paper: On Strategy-Proofness and Semilattice Single-Peakedness (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:219-238

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.005

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