Being of two minds: Ultimatum offers under cognitive constraints

Dominique Cappelletti, Werner Güth (gueth@coll.mpg.de) and Matteo Ploner

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2011, vol. 32, issue 6, 940-950

Abstract: We experimentally investigate how proposers in the Ultimatum Game behave when their cognitive resources are constrained by time pressure and cognitive load. In a dual-system perspective, when proposers are cognitively constrained and thus their deliberative capacity is reduced, their offers are more likely to be influenced by spontaneous affective reactions. We find that under time pressure proposers make higher offers. This increase appears not to be explained by more reliance on an equality heuristic. Analysing the behaviour of the same individual in both roles leads us to favour the strategic over the other-regarding explanation for the observed increase in offers. In contrast, proposers who are under cognitive load do not behave differently from proposers who are not.

Keywords: Ultimatum Game; Dual-system theories; Time pressure; Cognitive load; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (81)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:32:y:2011:i:6:p:940-950

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2011.08.001

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