Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments

Werner Güth (), Kerstin Pull, Manfred Stadler and Agnes Stribeck
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Agnes Stribeck: Human Resource Management and Organization, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Nauklerstraße 47, 72074 Tübingen, Germany
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Agnes Bäker

Games, 2010, vol. 1, issue 2, 1-14

Abstract: In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out - or at least weakens - efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design, differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player is the residual claimant and whether the proposer’s agreement payoff is larger, equal, or smaller than the other exogenously given agreement payoff.

Keywords: generosity game; equity; efficiency; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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