A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations

Johan Lagerlof

No 06/04, Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics from Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London

Abstract: I develop a model of rent seeking with informational foundations and an arbitrary number of rent seekers, and I compare the results with Tullock's (1980) classic model where the influence activities are "black-boxed." Given the microfoundations, the welfare consequences of rent seeking can be studied. In particular, I show that competition among rent seekers can be socially beneficial, since the additional information that the decision maker gets access to makes the increase in rent-seeking expenditures worthwhile. However, the analysis also highlights a logic that, under natural parameter assumptions, makes the rent seekers spend more resources on rent seeking than is in society's interest, which is consistent with the spirit of the rent-seeking literature.

Keywords: Rent seeking; competition; lobbying; information acquisition; disclosure; welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D43 D72 D83 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09, Revised 2006-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-com and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: A theory of rent seeking with informational foundations (2007)
Working Paper: A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations (2006)
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