Details about Johan N. M. Lagerlöf

Access statistics for papers by Johan N. M. Lagerlöf.

Last updated 2009-06-30. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pla53

Working Papers

2008

1. The Effects of Remedial Mathematics on the Learning of Economics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations

2007

2. The Effects of Remedial Mathematics on the Learning of Economics: A Natural Experiment
   Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London

2006

3. A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
   Also in
   Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London (2006)
   See Also Journal Article in Economics of Governance (2007)

2005

4. Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favor of Price Regulations
   Industrial Organization, EconWPA
   Also in
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2005) View citations
   Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London (2005)

2004

5. Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
   Also in
   Public Economics, EconWPA (2004)
   CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) (2004)
   Microeconomics, EconWPA (2004)
6. On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control
   Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London
   Also in
   CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) (2002)
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2003)
   See Also Journal Article in International Journal of Industrial Organization (2005)

2003

7. Are we Better Off if our Politicians Have More Information?
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
   Also in
   Public Economics, EconWPA (2002)
   See Also Journal Article in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (2004)
8. Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in the Samaritan's Dilemma
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
   Also in
   Microeconomics, EconWPA (2002) View citations
   See Also Journal Article in Economic Journal (2004)
9. Insisting on a Non-Negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare, and Multiple Equilibria
   Microeconomics, EconWPA
   Also in
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2003) View citations
   CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) (2003)
   Industrial Organization, EconWPA (2003)
   See Also Journal Article in International Journal of Industrial Organization (2007)

2002

10. Hiding Information in Electoral Competition
    CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) View citations
    See Also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2003)
11. Incomplete Information in the Samaritan's Dilemma: The Dilemma (Almost) Vanishes
    CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG)

2000

12. Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-Robustness
    CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG)
    See Also Journal Article in Public Choice (2003)

1999

13. Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Know How the Economy Works?
    CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG)
14. Costly Information Acquisition and Delegation to a "Liberal" Central Banker
    CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG)
    See Also Journal Article in Economics and Politics (2001)

1996

15. A welfare analysis of strategic information revelation
    Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics

Journal Articles

2008

1. Eliciting demand information through cheap talk: An argument in favor of a ban on price discrimination
   Economics Letters, 2008, 99, (3), 421-424

2007

2. A Model of Reputation in Cheap Talk
   Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2007, 109, (1), 49-70 View citations
3. A theory of rent seeking with informational foundations
   Economics of Governance, 2007, 8, (3), 197-218
   See Also Working Paper (2006)
4. Insisting on a non-negative price: Oligopoly, uncertainty, welfare, and multiple equilibria
   International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007, 25, (4), 861-875
   See Also Working Paper (2003)

2006

5. Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Cournot Model with Demand Uncertainty
   Topics in Theoretical Economics, 2006, 6, (1), 1333-1333

2005

6. On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control
   International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2005, 23, (9-10), 803-827 View citations
   See Also Working Paper (2004)

2004

7. Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?
   Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2004, 106, (1), 123-142 View citations
   See Also Working Paper (2003)
8. Efficiency-enhancing signalling in the Samaritan's dilemma
   Economic Journal, 2004, 114, (492), 55-69 View citations
   See Also Working Paper (2003)

2003

9. Hiding information in electoral competition
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, 42, (1), 48-74 View citations
   See Also Working Paper (2002)
10. Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-robustness
    Public Choice, 2003, 114, (3-4), 319-47
    See Also Working Paper (2000)

2001

11. Costly Information Acquisition and Delegation to a "Liberal" Central Banker
    Economics and Politics, 2001, 13, (3), 221-236
    See Also Working Paper (1999)

1997

12. Lobbying, information, and private and social welfare
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1997, 13, (3), 615-637 View citations