Individuals and teams in UMTS-license auctions

Matthias Sutter, Martin Kocher and Sabine Strauß

Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck

Abstract: We examine bidding behaviour of individuals and teams in an experimental auction resembling UMTS-license auctions. Even though in reality teams were largely involved in those auctions, experimental studies on bidding in auctions have so far relied on individual bidders. Our results show that teams stay on average longer in an (ascending sealed-bid English) auction and pay significantly higher prices than individuals. Consequently, teams make smaller profits and suffer more often the winner's curse. The auction's efficiency is nevertheless higher with teams, since the bidders with the highest valuation are more likely to win the auction when teams bid.

Keywords: UMTS auction; team decision-making; experiment; winner's curse (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2007-23

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