Reducing Rent Seeking by Providing Wide Public Service

Amihai Glazer and Stef Proost

No 101106, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: A winning coalition which sets policy cannot always ensure that members of the coalition will be the ones getting benefits. Different jurisdictions (including members of the winning coalition) may then engage in costly rent seeking. Maximizing the welfare of the winning coalition may therefore require providing services to jurisdictions which are not members of the winning coalition, thereby reducing rent seeking by members of the winning coalition. The paper shows how this mechanism can generate insuffcient supply of public services, and offers another explanation for the use of co-funding requirements by the central government.

Keywords: Publicly provided goods; Rent seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Reducing rent seeking by providing wide public service (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:irv:wpaper:101106

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