Worker Representation and Temporary Employment in Germany: The Deployment and Extent of Fixed-Term Contracts and Temporary Agency Work

John Addison, Paulino Teixeira, Philipp Grunau () and Lutz Bellmann ()
Additional contact information
Philipp Grunau: Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung
Lutz Bellmann: Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg

No 11378, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This study examines the potential impact of works councils and unions on the deployment of fixed-term contracts and agency temps. We report inter al. that works councils are associated with a higher number of temporary agency workers when demand volatility is high while the opposite holds for fixed-term contracts. These disparities likely reflect differences in function, with agency work being more directed toward the protection of a shrinking core and fixed-term contacts being as much a port of entry as a buffer stock. We are also able to identify the number of new hires with a fixed-term contract as well as the number of FTC conversions (into regular employment) and renewals, the correlates of which flows are broadly consistent with the stock data.

Keywords: complementarity; demand volatility; collective bargaining; agency temps; fixed-term contracts; stepping stones; buffer stocks; labor market duality; extensive/intensive margins; works councils; unions; Germany (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J21 J23 J41 J48 J51 J63 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-eur, nep-lab and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - revised version published in: Journal of Participation and Employee Ownership, 2019, 2 (1), 24-46.

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