Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect

Matthias Stefan (), Jürgen Huber, Michael Kirchler, Matthias Sutter and Markus Walzl
Additional contact information
Matthias Stefan: University of Innsbruck
Michael Kirchler: University of Innsbruck

No 13345, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked while another prosocial task is not: (i) a ranking influences behavior if individuals lag behind: they spend more total effort and substitute effort in the prosocial task with effort in the ranked task; (ii) those ahead in the ranking spend less total effort and lower relative effort in the ranked task. Implications for incentive schemes are discussed.

Keywords: framed field experiment; rank incentives; multi-tasking decision problem; finance professionals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D02 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hrm
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Published - published in: European Economic Review, 2023, 56, 104458

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Related works:
Journal Article: Monetary and social incentives in multi-tasking: The ranking substitution effect (2023)
Working Paper: Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect (2020)
Working Paper: Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect (2020)
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