Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive: Experimental Evidence

Gary Charness, David Masclet () and Marie Claire Villeval

No 5034, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate individuals' investment in status in an environment where no monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially improve their status (rank). We find that people express both intrinsic motivation and a taste for status. Indeed, people increase their effort when they are simply informed about their relative performance, and people pay both to sabotage others’ output and to artificially increase their own relative performance. In addition, stronger group identity favors positive rivalry and discourages sabotage among peers.

Keywords: experiment; competitive preferences; status seeking; rank (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D63 J28 J31 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2010-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

Published - revised version published as 'The dark side of competition for status' in: Management Science, 2014, 60 (1), 38–55

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https://docs.iza.org/dp5034.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive: Experimental Evidence (2011)
Working Paper: Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive: Experimental Evidence (2010)
Working Paper: Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive: Experimental Evidence (2010)
Working Paper: Competitive preferences and status as an incentive: experimental evidence (2010)
Working Paper: Competitive preferences and status as an incentive: experimental evidence (2010)
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