Bribery and Public Procurement - An Experimental Study

Susanne Büchner (), Andreas Freytag (), Luis G. Gonzalez () and Werner Güth ()
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Susanne Büchner: Max-Planck-Institute for Economics

No 06/2006, Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Expired!) from Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, School of of Economics and Business Administration

Abstract: A procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat (the auctioneer) who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider. The optimal bids and bribes are derived based on an iid private cost assumption. In the experiment, bribes are negatively framed (betweensubjects treatment) to capture that society is better off if bribes are rare or low. Although bids are lower than predicted, behavior is qualitatively in line with the linear equilibrium prediction. When bribes generate a negative externality, there is a significant increase in the variability of the data.

Keywords: Corruption; Procurement Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-01-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-reg
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Related works:
Journal Article: Bribery and public procurement: an experimental study (2008)
Working Paper: Bribery and Public Procurement - An Experimental Study - (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jen:jenasw:2006-06

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