Zur Politischen Ökonomie der Arbeitslosigkeit: Mancur Olson versus Insider-Outsider-Theorie

Ansgar Belke

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 1997, vol. 46, issue 3, 243-274

Abstract: In explaining persistently high unemployment, Mancur Olson’s logic of collective action and the insider-outsider approach both focus on simular incentive structures of pressure groups. This contribution examines the astonishingly rarely tested hypothesis that both approaches are compatible to be integrated in a broader and widely acceptable basis for overdue labour market reforms. Moreover, a straightforward political economy of reforms is derived from this synthesis. However, a deeper comparison reveals that both models also share a great weakness. They clearly do not incorporate interests common to insiders and outsiders and self-correcting mechanisms in the wake of steadily growing costs of unemployment.

Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-1997-0303

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