Picking the Winners

Pablo Amoros

No 2010-06, Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center

Abstract: We analyze the problem of choosing the w contestants who will win a competition within a group of n > w competitors when all jurors commonly observe who the w best contestants are, but they may be biased. We study conditions on the configuration of the jury so that it is possible to induce the jurors to always choose the best contestants, whoever they are. If the equilibrium concept is dominant strategies, the condition is very strong: there must be at least one juror who is totally impartial, and the planner must have some information about who this juror is. If the equilibrium concept is Nash (or subgame perfect) equilibria the condition is less demanding: for each pair of contestants, the planner must know at least one juror who is not biased in favor/against any of them. Furthermore, the latter condition is also necessary for any other equilibrium concept.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Social choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2010-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
Note: This is a revised version of METCwp2009-2
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https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2010-6.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Picking the winners (2013)
Working Paper: Picking the Winners (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mal:wpaper:2010-6

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