Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect

Matthias Stefan (), Jürgen Huber, Michael Kirchler, Matthias Sutter and Markus Walzl
Additional contact information
Matthias Stefan: University of Innsbruck
Jürgen Huber: University of Innsbruck
Michael Kirchler: University of Innsbruck

No 2020_10, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked while another prosocial task is not: (i) a ranking influences behavior if individuals lag behind: they spend more total effort and substitute effort in the prosocial task with effort in the ranked task; (ii) those ahead in the ranking spend less total effort and lower relative effort in the ranked task. Implications for incentive schemes are discussed.

Keywords: multi-tasking decision problem; rank incentives; framed field experiment; finance professionals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D02 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Monetary and social incentives in multi-tasking: The ranking substitution effect (2023)
Working Paper: Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect (2020)
Working Paper: Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_10

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