A Comment Concerning Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard

Gary Richardson

No 12719, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Hooks and Robinson argue that moral hazard induced by deposit insurance induced banks to invest in riskier assets in Texas during the 1920s. Their regressions suggest this manifestation of moral hazard may explain a portion of the events that occurred during the 1920s, but some other phenomena, hitherto overlooked, must also be at work. Economic logic and evidence form the archives of the Board of Governors suggest that phenomenon is mismanagement and defalcation by corporate officers, which increases when insurance reduces depositors' incentives to monitor and react to the safety and soundness of banks.

JEL-codes: E42 E44 E65 N1 N13 N2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-his, nep-ias and nep-mac
Note: DAE CF ME
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