Holdup by Junior Claimholders: Evidence from the Mortgage Market

Sumit Agarwal, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Souphala Chomsisengphet and Yan Zhang

No 20015, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: When borrowers are delinquent, senior debtholders prefer liquidation whereas junior debtholders prefer to maintain their option value by delaying resolution or modifying the loan. In the mortgage market, a conflict of interest (“holdup”) arises when servicers of securitized senior liens are also the owners of the junior liens on the same property. We show that holdup servicers are able to delay action on the first-lien mortgage. When they do act, servicers are more likely to choose resolutions that maintain their option value, favoring modification and soft foreclosures over outright foreclosures. Holdup behavior is more likely to result in borrower self-curing.

JEL-codes: G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cfn and nep-ure
Note: CF
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Published as Sumit Agarwal & Gene Amromin & Itzhak Ben-David & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Yan Zhang, 2019. "Holdup by Junior Claimholders: Evidence from the Mortgage Market," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol 54(01), pages 247-274.

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Journal Article: Holdup by Junior Claimholders: Evidence from the Mortgage Market (2019)
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