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Wage Posting or Wage Bargaining? A Test Using Dual Jobholders

Marta Lachowska, Alexandre Mas, Raffaele Saggio and Stephen Woodbury

No 28409, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We employ a revealed-preference test to distinguish between wage posting and wage bargaining in the labor market. Using a sample of dual jobholders in Washington State, we estimate the sensitivity of wages and separation rates to wage shocks in a secondary job. In lower parts of the wage distribution, improvements in the outside option lead to higher separations rates but not to higher wages, consistent with wage posting. In the highest wage quartile, improved outside options translate to higher wages, but not higher separation rates, consistent with bargaining. In the aggregate, bargaining appears to be a limited determinant of wage setting.

JEL-codes: J0 J2 J3 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma
Note: LS
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Marta Lachowska & Alexandre Mas & Raffaele D. Saggio & Stephen A. Woodbury, 2022. "Wage Posting or Wage Bargaining? A Test Using Dual Jobholders," Employment Research, vol 29(1), pages 1-3.
Published as Marta Lachowska & Alexandre Mas & Raffaele Saggio & Stephen A. Woodbury, 2022. "Wage Posting or Wage Bargaining? A Test Using Dual Jobholders," Journal of Labor Economics, vol 40(S1), pages S469-S493.

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