Multi-agent Route Choice Game for Transportation Engineering

Xuan Di, Henry Liu and David Levinson

No 100, Working Papers from University of Minnesota: Nexus Research Group

Abstract: In undergraduate transportation engineering courses, traffic assignment is a difficult concept for both instructors to teach and for students to learn, because it involves many mathematical derivations and computations. We have designed a multiplayer game to engage students in the process of learning route choice, so that students can visualize how the traffic gradually reach user equilibrium (UE). For one scenario, we employ a Braess' Paradox, and explore the phenomenon during the game-play. We have done the case-control and before-after comparisons. The statistical results show that, students who played the game improve their understanding of the Braess' Paradox more than those who did not play. Among game players, younger students benefit more in their learning; while those who are not comfortable with exploring a phenomenon on their own think this game not as effective as those who prefer hands-on learning experiences.

Keywords: route choice; traffic assignment; user equilibrium; equilibration; education; Braess' Paradox (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A22 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-tre and nep-ure
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Published in Transportation Research Record 2480 55-63.

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nex:wpaper:marc-game

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