A Multi-Agent Congestion and Pricing Model

Xi Zou and David Levinson

No 200605, Working Papers from University of Minnesota: Nexus Research Group

Abstract: A multi-agent model of travelers competing to utilize a roadway in time and space is presented in this paper to illustrate the effect of congestion and pricing on traveler behaviors and network equilibrium. To realize the spillover effect among travelers, N-player games are constructed in which the strategy set include (N+1) strategies. We solve the discrete N-player game (for N less than 8) and find Nash equilibria if they exist. This model is compared to the bottleneck model. The results of numerical simulation show that the two models yield identical results in terms of lowest total costs and marginal costs when a social optimum exists.

Keywords: Agent-based Model; Game Theory; Congestion; Queueing; Traffic Flow; Congestion Pricing; Road Pricing; Value Pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D10 D81 D83 R41 R42 R48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Transportmetrica Vol.2, No.3, 2006 pp.237-249.

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http://hdl.handle.net/11299/179933 First version, 2007 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nex:wpaper:multiagentcongestionmodel

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