Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types

Hongwei Gui, Rudolf M¨uller and Rakesh V. Vohra
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Rudolf Müller

No 1392, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy mechanisms with quasi-linear utilities and multi-dimensional types for a variety of preference domains. These characterizations are in terms of a monotonicity property on the underlying allocation rule.

Keywords: Dominant Strategy; Farkas Lemma; Combinatorial Auctions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Working Paper: Dominant strategy mechanisms with multidimensional types (2004)
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