Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members

Vera Angelova, Werner Güth and Martin Kocher
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Werner Güth: MPI for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

No 202, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.

Keywords: cooperation; leadership; social dilemma; public goods provision; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Working Paper: Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:202

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