Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing

Alejandro Saporiti

No WP48, Wallis Working Papers from University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy

Abstract: This paper analyzes collective choices in a society with strategic voters and single-crossing preferences. It shows that, in addition to single-peakedness, single-crossingness is another meaningful domain which guarantees the existence of non-manipulable social choice functions. A social choice function is shown to be anonymous, unanimous and strategy-proof on single-crossing domains if and only if it is an extended median rule with n-1 parameters distributed on the end points of the feasible set of alternatives. Such rules are known as positional dictators, and they include the median choice rule as a particular case. As a by-product, the paper also provides an strategic foundation for the so called "single-crossing version" of the Median Voter Theorem, by showing that the median ideal point can be implemented in dominant strategies through a simple mechanism in which each agent honestly reveals his preferences.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; single-crossing; median voter; positional dictators (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cse, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategy-proofness and single-crossing (2009)
Working Paper: Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:roc:wallis:wp48

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