Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules

Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus ()

Review of Economic Design, 2003, vol. 8, issue 3, 249-268

Abstract: We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizer, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Probabilistic rules; single-peaked preferences; strategy-proofness; uniform allocations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Working Paper: Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules (2001)
Working Paper: Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules (2001)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-003-0101-3

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