Blowing the Whistle

Jose Apesteguia, Martin Dufwenberg and Reinhard Selten

No 9/2003, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Abstract: Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.

Keywords: Anti-trust; leniency; immunity; amnesty; blow the whistle; cartels; pricecompetition; Bertrand model; experiment; communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Blowing the Whistle (2007)
Working Paper: Blowing the Whistle (2003)
Working Paper: Blowing the Whistle (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bonedp:92003

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