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Details about Jean-François Caulier

E-mail:jean-francois.caulier@univ-paris1.fr
Homepage:http://centres.fusl.ac.be/CEREC/document/people/caulier.html
Postal address:43 Bd du Jardin Botanique, 1000 Bruxelles Belgium
Workplace:Centre de Recherche en Économie (CEREC) (Economics Research Center), Université Saint-Louis (Saint Louis University), (more information at EDIRC)
Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne (Sorbonne Economic Centre), Université Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne) (University of Paris 1), (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Jean-François Caulier.

Last updated 2018-08-07. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pca586


Jump to Journal Articles

Working Papers

2017

  1. Les marchés où l'argent ne fait pas la loi
    Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL View citations (1)

2015

  1. Allocation rules for coalitional network games
    Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL Downloads View citations (5)
    Also in LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (2015) View citations (5)
    LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (2013) Downloads View citations (7)

    See also Journal Article Allocation rules for coalitional network games, Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier (2015) Downloads View citations (5) (2015)

2014

  1. Fondements mathématiques pour l'économie et la gestion
    Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL

2013

  1. An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes
    Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL Downloads
    Also in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne (2013) Downloads

    See also Journal Article An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes, Economic Theory, Springer (2015) Downloads View citations (1) (2015)
  2. Contractually stable networks
    LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) View citations (13)
    Also in Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2009) Downloads
    LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (2008) Downloads
    Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL (2013) Downloads View citations (17)
    Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques), Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques (2008) Downloads
    NajEcon Working Paper Reviews, www.najecon.org (2007) Downloads View citations (5)

    See also Journal Article Contractually stable networks, International Journal of Game Theory, Springer (2013) Downloads View citations (19) (2013)
  3. Stable and efficient coalitional networks
    LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) View citations (13)
    Also in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (2011) Downloads View citations (3)
    Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL (2013) View citations (11)

    See also Journal Article Stable and efficient coalitional networks, Review of Economic Design, Springer (2013) Downloads View citations (15) (2013)

2011

  1. The Interpretation of the Laakso-Taagepera Effective Number of Parties
    Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne Downloads View citations (1)
    Also in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL (2011) Downloads View citations (1)

2010

  1. On the measurement of Fragmentation
    Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL Downloads View citations (1)

2009

  1. A note on the monotonicity and superadditivity of TU cooperative games
    Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL Downloads

2005

  1. The effective number of relevant parties: how voting power improves Laakso-Taagepera’s index
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (2)

Journal Articles

2017

  1. Allocation Rules for Networks Inspired by Cooperative Game-Theory
    Revue d'économie politique, 2017, 127, (4), 517-558 Downloads View citations (4)

2015

  1. Allocation rules for coalitional network games
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, 78, (C), 80-88 Downloads View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper Allocation rules for coalitional network games, Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) (2015) Downloads View citations (5) (2015)
  2. An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes
    Economic Theory, 2015, 60, (2), 283-313 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes, Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) (2013) Downloads (2013)
  3. Editorial: Contributions to game theory and social choice
    Annals of Operations Research, 2015, 225, (1), 1-2 Downloads

2013

  1. Contractually stable networks
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2013, 42, (2), 483-499 Downloads View citations (19)
    See also Working Paper Contractually stable networks, LIDAM Reprints CORE (2013) View citations (13) (2013)
  2. Stable and efficient coalitional networks
    Review of Economic Design, 2013, 17, (4), 249-271 Downloads View citations (15)
    See also Working Paper Stable and efficient coalitional networks, LIDAM Reprints CORE (2013) View citations (13) (2013)
 
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