Allocation rules for coalitional network games

Jean-François Caulier (), Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, vol. 78, issue C, 80-88

Abstract: Coalitional network games are real-valued functions defined on a set of players organized into a network and a coalition structure. We adopt a flexible approach assuming that players organize themselves the best way possible by forming the efficient coalitional network structure. We propose two allocation rules that distribute the value of the efficient coalitional network structure: the atom-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule and the player-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule.

Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Allocation rules for coalitional network games (2015)
Working Paper: Allocation rules for coalitional network games (2015)
Working Paper: Allocation rules for coalitional network games (2015)
Working Paper: Allocation rules for coalitional network games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:78:y:2015:i:c:p:80-88

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.08.003

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