Allocation rules for coalitional network games

Jean-François Caulier (), Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 2013032, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Coalitional network games are real-valued functions defined on a set of players organized into a network and a coalition structure. We adopt a flexible approach assuming that players organize themselves the best way possible by forming the efficient coalitional network structure. We propose two allocation rules that distribute the value of the efficient coalitional network structure: the atom-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule and the player-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule.

Keywords: networks; coalition structures; allocation rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 C71 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Allocation rules for coalitional network games (2015)
Working Paper: Allocation rules for coalitional network games (2015)
Working Paper: Allocation rules for coalitional network games (2015)
Working Paper: Allocation rules for coalitional network games (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2013032

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