Allocation rules for coalitional network games

Jean-François Caulier (), Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 2718, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date: 2015-01-01
Note: In : Mathematical Social Sciences, 78, 2015, p. 80-88
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Related works:
Journal Article: Allocation rules for coalitional network games (2015)
Working Paper: Allocation rules for coalitional network games (2015)
Working Paper: Allocation rules for coalitional network games (2015)
Working Paper: Allocation rules for coalitional network games (2013)
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