Cross-State Strategic Voting

Gordon Dahl, Joseph Engelberg, Runjing Lu and William Mullins

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2026, vol. 18, issue 1, 159-89

Abstract: We estimate that 3.1 percent of US voters, or 6.1 million individuals, were registered to vote in two states in 2020, opening up the possibility for them to choose where to vote. Double registrants are concentrated in the wealthiest zip codes and respond to both incentives and costs, disproportionately choosing to vote in swing states (higher incentive) and states that automatically send out mail-in ballots (lower cost). We call this behavior Cross-State Strategic Voting. While others have documented strategic incentives on who to vote for, this paper is the first to consider strategic incentives on where to vote.

JEL-codes: D63 D72 K16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Working Paper: Cross-State Strategic Voting (2023)
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DOI: 10.1257/pol.20240630

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