The Political Economics of Non-democracy
Georgy Egorov and
Konstantin Sonin
Journal of Economic Literature, 2024, vol. 62, issue 2, 594-636
Abstract:
We survey recent theoretical and empirical literature on political economics of non-democracies. Nondemocratic regimes face multiple challenges to their rule, both internal, such as palace coups or breakdown of their support coalition, and external, such as mass protests or revolutions. We analyze strategic decisions made by dictators from the standpoint of maximizing the chances of regime survival in the light of these challenges, and show how it explains multiple common patterns, from hiring political loyalists to positions that require competence, to restricting media freedom at the cost of sacrificing bureaucratic efficiency, to running propaganda campaigns, organizing election fraud, purging opponents and associates, and repressing citizens.
JEL-codes: D72 D73 D82 D83 L82 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Political Economics of Non-democracy (2020) 
Working Paper: The Political Economics of Non-democracy (2020) 
Working Paper: The Political Economics of Non-democracy (2020) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:62:y:2024:i:2:p:594-636
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DOI: 10.1257/jel.20221494
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