Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy

Lisandro Abrego and Carlo Perroni

No 269254, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: We describe a model of dynamic pollution abatement choices with heterogeneous agents, where, due to the presence of a distributional objective and to the absence of incentive-compatible compensation mechanisms, the choice of a second-best level of emission taxation is time-inconsistent. In this model, we investigate whether investment subsidies can act as a substitute for policy commitment.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 1999-06-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Investment subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy (2002)
Working Paper: Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy (1999)
Working Paper: Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269254

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269254

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