Auction Market Design: Recent Innovations

Paul Milgrom

Annual Review of Economics, 2019, vol. 11, issue 1, 383-405

Abstract: Market design applies economic principles to the often messy problems of real-world exchange in which goods may not be homogeneous, the identities of trading partners may matter, contracts may not be executed, and even the formulation of trade as balancing supply and demand may be unhelpful. This article recounts the mostly academic research advancing the analysis and design of such markets. Among the highlighted applications are ones involving financial markets, Internet advertising, electricity auctions, spectrum auctions, cryptocurrencies, and combinatorial procurements.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025818
Full text downloads are only available to subscribers. Visit the abstract page for more information.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:anr:reveco:v:11:y:2019:p:383-405

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.annualreviews.org/action/ecommerce

DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025818

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Annual Review of Economics from Annual Reviews Annual Reviews 4139 El Camino Way Palo Alto, CA 94306, USA.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by http://www.annualreviews.org ().