Sampling Logit Equilibrium and Endogenous Payoff Distortion

Minoru Osawa

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We introduce the sampling logit equilibrium (SLE), a stationary concept for population games in which agents evaluate actions using a finite sample of opponents' plays and respond according to a logit choice rule. This framework combines informational frictions from finite sampling with stochastic choice. When the sample size is large, SLE is well approximated by a logit equilibrium of a virtual game whose payoffs incorporate explicit distortion terms generated by sampling noise. Examples illustrate how finite sampling can systematically shift equilibrium behavior and generate equilibrium selection effects.

Date: 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-gth
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