EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Sanctions, Evasion, and Deterrence: Evidence from Speeding Enforcement

Romain Gauriot and Maria Wisniewska

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The design of sanctions plays a central role in shaping reoffending behavior. We study the effects of fixed monetary fines and accumulating penalty points on speeding recidivism and liability transfer. Exploiting a large increase in sanctions in Queensland, Australia, we estimate the causal effects of these sanctions on subsequent offending and nomination of other drivers. Higher demerit points increase fine renomination, consistent with strategic blame shifting. Estimated reductions in reoffending are small among offenders facing higher fines alone. Reoffending falls by a substantial 4.6 percentage points when higher fines are accompanied by additional penalty points.

Date: 2026-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2611.09337 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2611.09337

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().

 
Page updated 2026-11-16
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2611.09337