Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition

Alejandro Neme, R. Pablo Arribillaga and Jordi Massó
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jordi Masso

No 1456, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition is the finest. For any partition, it falls between these two extremes. We establish two general properties of this new notion and apply it to the simple anonymous voting problem with two alternatives and strict preferences.

Keywords: obvious strategy-proofness; extended majority voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Related works:
Working Paper: Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition (2024)
Working Paper: Obvious Strategy-proofness with Respect to a Partition (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:1456

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