On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-Peakedness

Inés Moreno de Barreda
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jordi Masso

No 421, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.

Keywords: strategy-proofness; Single-peaked preferences; median voter; Feasibility Constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness (2011)
Working Paper: On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-peakedness (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:421

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