Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives

Jan-Henrik Steg, Elshan Garashli, Michael Greinecker and Christoph Kuzmics
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Jan-Henrik Steg: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Elshan Garashli: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Michael Greinecker: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Christoph Kuzmics: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 727, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: For cheap-talk games with a binary state space in which the sender has state-independent preferences, we characterize equilibria that are robust to introducing slight state-dependence on the side of the sender. Not all equilibria are robust, but the sender-optimum is always achieved at some robust equilibrium.

Keywords: Cheap talk; Communication; Information transmission; Robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33
Date: 2025-08-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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