Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games are the Generalized Condorcet Winners

Murat Sertel and Remzi Sanver

Working Papers from Department of Economics, Bilkent University

Date: 2001
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Journal Article: Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners (2004)
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